conflict

Three reasons “Plan Colombia” won’t work in Central America

General John Kelly, Commander of U.S. Southern Combatant Command, told an audience at the National Defense University on October 8 that Central American governments should seek to replicate “the miracle of Colombia” when it comes to security. Colombia is “a great example,” said Kelly, “of what can be done so long as a government and a people, along with some help from the United States” cooperate on security issues.

Kelly made similar comments in a recent interview with Military Times and in an interview with the Daily Mail, the four-star general warned of the potential for “mass migration into the U.S.” if the African Ebola epidemic were to somehow spread to Central America. “It’s literally, ‘Katie bar the door,'” the general said, describing the hypothetical situation along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Gen. Kelly is not the only policy heavyweight to have fear-mongered about Central American refugees, and he is not the only one to have proposed Colombia’s experience as a model for Central America to follow. On both accounts, he has been joined by Dan Restrepo, currently a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and previously President Barack Obama’s top advisor on the Americas during his first term. The same can be said of former SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral James Stavridis.

Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández and his Guatemalan counterpart Otto Perez Molina have both called for the implementation of a”Plan Colombia” for Central America, hinting that increased assistance from the United States might enable them to ameliorate the politically-problematic flow of migrants through Mexico and into the United States.

There are a number of problems with the Colombia model, but below are the most important reasons why its application could have especially negative consequences for Central America – particularly in the violent “Northern Triangle” region comprising El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras:

1.) Central American countries have weaker institutions than Colombia. While Colombia’s civil conflict continues in tandem with ongoing peace negotiations, Central American countries signed peace accords ending their civil wars years ago. Nevertheless, post-conflict political institutions and security forces in Central America haven’t had fifty years to adapt to the soaring levels of violence seen in the region in recent years. In fact, although it is still the tenth-highest in the world, Colombia’s murder rate has been in steady decline for a decade.

2.) This weakness manifests itself in susceptibility to corruption and intimidation. The criminal underworld is alive and well in Colombia, though not in the same shape and form as it was during the initial years of Plan Colombia. Instead, the militarized crackdown on guerrillas and narco-traffickers drove many of these groups further underground, diffusing them into smaller and more widely disbursed networks and pushing them into new markets and geographic areas.

In fact, there is compelling evidence that Colombian criminal organizations are using Central American “transportista” groups as middlemen in the trafficking of drugs from South to North. Transnational criminal organizations, often based in Mexico and Colombia provide the huge amounts of capital necessary to supply large amounts of illicit goods and to pay off the police and political officials as well as any “sub-contractors.”

3.) Central America has a plan Colombia and it isn’t working. The essence of the “Plan Colombia” strategy is a heavy-handed, zero-tolerance approach to crime. The U.S. has provided more than half a billion dollars in military and police aid to Central America since 2009. That may not sound like much compared to the $7 billion investment made in Plan Colombia, but in both cases, the thrust of assistance efforts has been toward tactical and operational capacity rather than addressing the institutional weaknesses and corruption that lie at the root of the violence.

Colombia is not a good model for conflict resolution (yet)

The multi-billion dollar US-backed “Plan Colombia” initiative that began in the late 1990s and continued in various forms throughout the 2000s has been cited by a number of officials and commentators recently as an example of a counter-insurgency/anti-narcotics operation that has achieved significant progress in dismantling criminal and paramilitary groups operating within that country.

Dan Restrepo, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the former principal adviser on the Americas region to President Barack Obama, recently contrasted the “political and economic elite” of Colombia with the elite of Honduras, who he says “haven’t gone about the hard work of working toward a state that functions” like their Colombian counterparts have.

Soon thereafter, Restrepo co-authored a report for CAP suggesting that Colombia cooperate with Mexico and the United States to replicate their supposed successes in Central America. The presidents of Guatemala and Honduras have also called on the United States to implement a “Plan Colombia” for Central America to help the countries of the “Northern Triangle” deal with the gang violence that has made those nations among the most dangerous on the planet.

Speaking of war zones, Dr. James Stavridis, a retired Navy admiral and current Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University who was the Commander of USSOUTHCOM during the later iterations of Plan Colombia from 2006 to 2009, authored a piece in Foreign Policy on Friday suggesting that Colombia’s transition from “the basket case it was a decade ago” to its present peace and prosperity could be a seen as a model for “the Arab world” to emulate. Stavridis starts off by characterizing the Colombian conflict as follows:

A 50-year ideological struggle, hundreds of thousands killed, millions displaced, mass graves, murder, rape, torture, a virulent insurgency threatening the overthrow of the entire social order, a rebel enclave carved out of the heart of a big nation. Sounds a lot like the Middle East today.

Stavridis never explains specifically how the situation in “the Middle East today” is similar to the one in Colombia. The Middle East is obviously not “a big nation” and it is misleading to characterize Colombia’s rebel groups as a “virulent insurgency threatening the overthrow of the entire social order.” Though I am not an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, it is my understanding that tensions in that region exist among a large number of countries and groups whose alliances are tangled in an ideological and geopolitical web much more convoluted than that of the combatants in the Colombian civil conflict.

Stavridis concedes that “there are big challenges ahead” for Colombia but says “[c]learly, something has changed over the past decade. ” What is that “something”? He explains:

The strength of the major insurgency group, the FARC, has been halved between 2002 and 2010, from 16,000 fighters down to 8,000. Between 2002 and 2012, the murder rate dropped from 70 deaths per 100,000 people to 31 per 100,000. Kidnappings have dropped by more than 90 percent since 2002. And there are other successes to crow over: There are ongoing peace talks for a lasting settlement between the government and the FARC; the country has re-elected President Juan Manuel Santos on a platform of conflict resolution; trade and the GDP are up; Medellín, the nation’s second-largest city, is lauded as the “most innovative city in the world“; and Colombia is popping up on tourist “top 10” lists everywhere. [Ed. note: one of which is the “top ten” nationwide murder rate list, as discussed below.] The country even made the final round at the World Cup. [Ed. note: Colombia’s squad was knocked out by Brazil in the quarter-finals of the 2014 World Cup. It was the first team the country has fielded at the tournament since 1998.]

How did Colombia achieve these “successes to crow over”? According to Stavridis, a $7 billion militarized crackdown on Drugs and Terror under Plan Colombia played a significant role. Also, “Interagency cooperation [was] key…In Plan Colombia, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Drug Enforcement Administration all had parts to play.” Stavridis does not mention the contributions of Colombian institutions aside from an earlier fleeting reference to “the vigor and determination of the Colombian people.”

Oddly, Stavridis also cites the free trade agreement between the US and Colombia, which went into effect just over two years ago in May 2012, as part of the reason that Colombia has an “economy that is rapidly expanding [Ed note: there has been no ‘rapid’ increase in growth over the last decade] as a result of lower violence, greater political stability, and the effects of the FTA.” The hyperlink on the word “effects”, which appears in the original article, connects to the US Department of Commerce’s Export.gov website, which lists the “benefits” of the FTA:

Over 80 percent of U.S. industrial goods exports to Colombia became duty-free including agricultural and construction equipment, building products, aircraft and parts, fertilizers, information technology equipment, medical and scientific equipment, and wood. Other benefits of the TPA include:

  • More than half of U.S. exports of agricultural commodities to Colombia became duty-free, including wheat, barley, soybeans, high-quality beef, bacon, and almost all fruit and vegetable products.
  • Stronger protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in Colombia.
  • Increased access to Colombia’s $180 billion services market for highly competitive American companies.

Note that this list does not highlight “benefits” accrued to the Colombian economy. Just as the contributions of the Colombian military, law enforcement and judicial system in reducing violence and crime were of little concern to Stavridis, so are the “effects” of the FTA on the Colombian people.

In the first year after the FTA went into effect, exports from Colombia to the US fell by 15% while imports rose, hurting the competitiveness of local small businesses. Labor rights activists and union members continued to be killed with impunity. In August 2013, demonstrations organized by small-scale farmers to protest the government’s agricultural policies turned deadly in Bogotá. In March 2014, tens of thousands of farmers participated in similar demonstrations in the capital city.

Violence in Colombia has indeed been reduced from its peak, but it remains a major issue in Colombian society in all its permutations, whether it be homicide, suicide, sexual or domestic. Last year, the United Nations found that Colombia had the tenth highest murder rate in the world. Cali, the capital of the gang-ravaged Valle del Cauca department, was ranked the 4th most dangerous city in the world in 2013 by a Mexican NGO, with a homicide rate of 83.2 per 100,000. Palmira, Santa Marta, Cúcuta, Pereira and Medellín also fell within the top fifty.

Stavridis correctly notes that “often the youth of a region take to the streets and fall under the sway of violent messages because there are very few real alternatives.” He claims that “private-public projects are vital,” without referring to a single specific instance of such a project producing positive results in Colombia. One example that came to my mind was the multi-million dollar “shock plan” recently proposed for Buenaventura – a combination of increased private investment and a militarized, Plan Colombia-like public safety strategy.

But as early as 2007, Ana María Mercedes Cano, who was then the director of the Buenaventura Chamber of Commerce, warned in a New York Times interview about the connection between economic hardship and violent crime. “There is no other viable industry here, so there are no other viable jobs,” Cano said. “So we live in a situation with violence all around us.” Despite its economic potential as one of Colombia’s primary Pacific ports, unemployment in the city is currently estimated to be above 60% and it remains one of the country’s most violently contested drug trafficking areas. Some recent reports suggest that gang violence on the Pacific coast has superseded the civil conflict as the primary driver of internal displacement.

Stavridis writes that tackling corruption should be another priority for those seeking to mimic the Colombian model:

In Colombia, frustration with inequality and corruption created the spark that set off larger anti-government movements such as the FARC. To be legitimate in the eyes of the people, governance has to be evenhanded, relatively transparent, oriented toward human rights, and free of corruption. The work done in Colombia by anti-corruption task forces coached by U.S. interagency teams from the Department of Justice, FBI, and DEA, for example, had an effect.

Historical reductivism aside, Colombia today remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, and while “the work” of US agencies may have “had an effect,” corruption also remains a major issue. As Colombia Reports wrote in 2012:

From the beginning of 2005′s controversial Justice and Peace Law until the end of April 2012, prosecutors and officials have requested the investigation of 943 politicians, 870 military members, 330 public servants and 9,036 civilians, including several business owners suspected of contributing to paramilitary organizations in some fashion.

Major companies in the mining and agriculture sectors have similarly been accused of colluding with – or claimed to have been intimidated by – paramilitaries and drug traffickers in recent months and years. Just weeks before the first round of the presidential election this spring, President Juan Manuel Santos’ campaign chief was forced to resign over allegations that he took a $12 million bribe to pitch his boss a surrender proposal from some of the country’s most powerful drug lords. The Colombian Senate recently declined to debate former president and current Senator Álvaro Uribe’s alleged connection to paramilitary groups, possibly for fear of exposing their own ties.

The “false guerrillas” (also known as “false positives”) scandal, which reached its peak during the second Uribe administration (2006-2010), is another example of stunted progress in terms of corruption and human rights. Stavridis claims that “the apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of military members for reporting ‘false guerrillas’ in order to cover up extrajudicial killings also showed the public that officials would be held accountable.” However, according to another Colombia Reports article from June of this year:

Seven years after the scandal originally broke, only 27.6% of those members of the public security forces believed to have participated in the false positives practice — in which civilians were murdered and disguised as guerrillas slain in combat — have been investigated, while only 15% have been charged with a crime, according to the latest figures, which cut off in January 2014.

The Prosecutor General’s Office informed Colombia Reports that there have been at least 4,212 victims of “false positives” and that at least 4,774 members of the public security forces are believed to have been responsible.

…

Of the 722 Army personnel convicted of false positives charges, 90% fall below the rank of lieutenant, and none rises above the rank of colonel. Of the five generals whose units produced the highest incidence rates of false positives, three were named commander general of the Armed Forces. [emphasis added]

Finally, echoing Mr. Restrepo, Stavridis leaves us with the following nugget of wisdom: “Success depends on the people.”

Even if the international community does everything above perfectly, will Iraq right itself? Will Syria suddenly stabilize? No. It will ultimately depend on the will of the people of the Arab world — or any other nation or region — to wrench their society back from the destructive influence of violent extremism. But we can certainly help — with financial, political, educational, developmental, and limited military support, much as we did in Colombia — and we should, despite the intense frustration.

In truth, US assistance to Colombia has not been primarily “financial, political, educational, [and] developmental” in conjunction with “limited military support” – it has been just the opposite. Needless to say, the Colombian conflict has next to nothing in common with those in Iraq and Syria, either historically or politically. The situations in each country have vastly different causes and compositions and will likely require unique solutions. Colombia is an extremely flawed model for conflict resolution to begin with, but it is utterly asinine to attempt to apply it to Iraq or Syria – not to mention “the Arab world” in general.

To his credit, Stavridis did mention an important point made by President Santos in a pre-election interview with Der Spiegel. According to Santos, “it’s not possible to exterminate [the FARC].” As the retired admiral puts it, “There are no purely military solutions to pulling a nation or region out of the death spiral of violent extremism. We cannot kill our way to success.”

Hopefully, if the current peace process with the FARC manages to succeed, Colombia can one day be an example of how even the longest-running, bloodiest and most deeply divisive conflicts can be solved with words and not weapons. But, right now, it has a long way to go.

Mexico: Arrival of UN Special Rapporteur puts spotlight on torture and impunity

Cross-posted with Conflict Journal

This is a weekly roundup of events from 20 April to 26 April 2014.

The UN Special Rapporteur for Torture, Juan Méndez, arrived in Mexico to begin an investigation into the country’s penal reforms and other aspects of the country’s law enforcement and justice systems. His visit is expected to last until May 2.

Despite thousands of reports of torture committed by Mexican security forces over the past decade, not a single person has been found guilty of the crime. A report presented to Méndez claimed that “despite [the Attorney General’s office] having found evidence of torture in 128 cases, there were no convictions.” The Attorney General’s office confirmed that from 2002 to 2012 there were only 39 preliminary investigations into torture and that no criminal proceedings or warrants were issued.

Earlier this month, Enrique Hernández, the leader of an autodefensa in Yrécaro, Michoacán was arrested along with 18 others on suspicion of involvement in the murder of Gustavo Garibay, the Mayor of Tanhuato. The State Human Rights Commission in Michoacán said that Hernández had sustained injuries consistent with his claims that he was tortured by the police.

Mexico’s Senate unanimously approved legislation that would allow military personnel accused of crimes against civilians to be tried in civilian rather than military courts. The legislation still has to be approved by the lower house, but it is widely considered a step in the right direction. A study from the Wilson Center released last month concluded that 90% of Mexican citizens feel they cannot trust the police. This lack of trust likely contributed to the rise of vigilante self-defense groups known as autodefensas, which are proving to be a major security challenge for the government.

Michoacán Federal Safety Commissioner Alfredo Castillo said that 44 “pseudoautodefensas” were arrested. Those who were detained were allegedly linked to organized crime groups, but were attempting to pass themselves off as members of the self-defense forces.

Federal police and military intelligence documents obtained by Proceso show that the government believes many autodefensas are infiltrated by criminal groups, something a number of observers have long suspected. Documents the magazine reported on last week indicated that the low-profile leader of a self-defense force in Michoacán, Miguel Ángel Gallegos Godoy (alias “El Migueladas”), is “the real boss” of the Knights Templar organization.

Following an agreement reached by leaders of the self-defense groups and the government last week, Castillo announced that the process of disarming unregistered autodefensas in Michoacán will begin on Monday. For more on the agreement, see our previous post.

Headlines:

97 police in Michoacán were fired this week for failing confidence exams.

Mexico’s public safety agency reported a continuation in an upward trend of serious crimes, including homicides, kidnappings and violent robberies. A new report from the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security modified homicide statistics from Veracruz state to account for 299 previously-unreported murders. The report also noted that kidnappings in Veracruz increased by 51% over the first quarter of 2013.

According to business groups in Monterrey, extortion in the area rose by 49% year-over-year in the first quarter of 2014.

Mexico has experienced a dramatic increase in domestic heroin consumption, likely due to increased production of the drug in that country. Farmers who previously grew marijuana appear to be replacing cannabis crops with opium poppies, potentially in response to a price drop in the marijuana market.

The Director General of Mexico’s National System for the Comprehensive Development of the Family, Laura Vargas, said that according to a study by the UN, nearly 70,000 children in Mexico have been victims of sex trafficking.

The government closed a saw mill and a steel plant in Michoacán that allegedly belonged to organized criminal groups.

The arrests of the two highest-level members of the Los Rojos gang, Antonio Reina Castillo and Ismael Castillo Marino, earlier this month probably won’t ameliorate the ongoing violence in Guerrero state, where the group is based. Los Rojos are one of several groups that grew out of the Beltran Leyva Organization and have been vying for dominance in an increasingly bloody turf war.

An attack by armed civilians on security forces in Mier, Tamaulipas left one civilian dead. Government troops seized various weapons and tactical gear and arrested two people in connection with the attack.

Federal and regional forces, working off of an anonymous tip, rescued 60 migrants who were captured by organized crime groups in Tamaulipas, near the Texas border. According to the National Commission on Human Rights, some 10,000 migrants have been kidnapped in Mexico over the last six months.

Seven people were killed in separate shootouts between police and armed gunmen in Tamaulipas.

Arturo Gallegos Castrellón, alias “El Farmero,” was handed 10 life sentences by an El Paso court for his role in the murders of three people associated with the US consulate in Juarez in 2010.

According to the Institute of Social Security for the Mexican Armed Forces, the government spent roughly $110,000,000 on life insurance for military personnel between 2008 and 2012, putting a strain on finances.

The Gulf Cartel launched a campaign in the streets of Mexico City to recruit youths to join their group.

To Watch:

Mexico’s National Security Commissioner Monte Alejandro Rubido Garcia said that the newly formed Gendarmerie will not be infiltrated by organized crime groups, claiming that the selection process for cadets was “very careful.”

In the wake of anti-censorship protests, Mexico’s ruling party appears to be stepping back from proposed legislation that would have given authorities the power to “temporarily block, inhibit or annul telecommunications signals at events and places deemed critical for the public safety.”

US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel expressed a desire to expand defense cooperation between the US and Mexico during a visit to the later country. The US  State Department announced the planned sale of 18 Black Hawk transport helicopters to Mexico.

The Council of the European Union is mulling an agreement between the European police agency Europol and Mexican authorities to cooperate on issues of organized crime and violent radical groups. However, the European Parliament recently rejected such a proposal due to concerns about the security of information that would potentially be shared with Mexican law enforcement, which has a reputation for corruption and infiltration by criminal elements.

Extra:

Two articles this week highlighted the dangers facing migrants traveling on “La Bestia” (“The Beast”), a freight train that many migrants from Mexico and Central America ride illegally in an attempt to reach the United States. Fusion and Vocativ both take a look at some of the migrants’ stories, which often include injury, kidnapping, robbery, rape and even death. Migrants from Central America marched to the presidential residence in Mexico this week and requested a meeting with President Peñã Nieto to demand that the government “ensure the right to free passage across the country without humiliation or violence, on our way to the northern border.”

Colombia: Peace talks with FARC enter 24th round

Cross-posted with Conflict Journal

This is a weekly roundup of events from 20 April to 26 April 2014.

On Thursday, the 24th round of peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC commenced in Havana. The previous round ended on April 11 without an agreement on the issues of illicit crop cultivation and drug trafficking, which are expected to be the focus of the new session. President Santos said earlier that he expects to reach a deal with the FARC regarding their involvement in the drug trade “in the near future.”

The FARC reiterated their desire for the government to commit to forming a truth commission “to clarify the history of the conflict” before they will discuss reparations for victims. The government has previously said it is willing to form such a commission only after a final deal is reached.

The chief negotiator for the Colombian government in the ongoing peace negotiations, Humberto de la Calle, pushed back against reports that the government was negotiating a drawdown of military and police forces or a demilitarization of the “peasant reserve zones” as part of the talks. “I say categorically that none of this is true,” he said during a statement to the press.

Messages obtained by El Universal appear to show the top leader of the FARC, “Timochenko,” venting his frustration with the “apathy and indolence” of some of the group’s members to other guerrilla leaders. The messages seem to acknowledge that the government’s military efforts against the rebels are succeeding. The FARC “are being beaten every day,” reads one message.

A pamphlet allegedly produced by the FARC was discovered, which threatened members of former President and Senator-elect Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Center party as well as a radio station and workers for multinational corporations in the department of Arauca.

The Colombian government claims that emails found on confiscated FARC computers indicate coordination between the FARC and the ELN for attacks planned in the next month. According to one message the plan was “to select feasible military objectives and that they impact…and seriously affect the economy.”

Headlines:

The closure of the Caño Limon-Coveñas pipeline in northwestern Colombia due to a series of attacks allegedly carried out by the ELN has cost the government $136 million in royalties, taxes and dividends. The U’wa indigenous group have refused to allow workers access to their land in order to repair to the pipeline. Negotiations with the group ended in failure for the government with the group’s spokesperson saying “The proposals they offered weren’t close to what we were demanding…We will continue to not authorize the repair of the oil pipe.”

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos reinstated ousted Bogotá mayor Gustavo Petro following a court order requiring him to do so. However, Santos has promised to challenge the decision in a higher court. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights lauded the ruling in favor of Petro, noting that the organization will “continue to monitor the situation.” The IACHR previously made a similar ruling, which was ignored by Santos.

One Colombian soldier was killed and thirteen others were wounded when an army convoy set off mines allegedly laid by FARC guerrillas in the Norte de Santander region.

Colombian rancher and union leader Luis Alberto Álvarez, who was kidnapped by the ELN last week, was found dead near the Venezuelan border. Álvarez’s death may have an impact on the agricultural strike planned for April 28.

Two Hondurans, two Venezuelans and one Colombian national were detained by Colombian security forces in Caribbean waters. They were carrying 750 kilos of cocaine as well as fuel, communications equipment and firearms. Authorities claimed the cache belonged to Víctor Ramón Navarro, alias “Megateo,” a member of the People’s Liberation Army (EPL).

To Watch:

The ministers of Interior, Agriculture and Finance held a meeting to discuss new efforts to head off a strike planned by Colombian farmers on 28 April. Some of the proposals included subsidy policies, debt refinancing plans, a halt to confiscation of debtors’ farms and social investments. Colombia’s Coffee Federation (Fedecafe) has announced that it will pay stipends to 74,000 coffee farmers who had not received the payments promised after a nationwide strike last August that resulted in five deaths and hundreds of injuries as police clashed with demonstrators. Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón claimed that organized crime groups are involved in the organization of the planned agricultural strike.

Colombia may do away with its aerial cocaine eradication program as part of its efforts to reach an agreement with the FARC over the drugs issue. The United States suspended its fumigation program last year after two US pilots were shot down by FARC guerillas.

Colombia’s largest daily newspaper, El Tiempo, has reported in further detail on how recently-reinstated Bogotá Mayor Gustavo Petro’s lawyers received government contracts in the lead-up to his dismissal. Petro has consistently denied that the contracts had any link to his legal defense.

Chiquita Brands International, a multinational fruit and vegetable company, has asked a US Federal Court to dismiss a lawsuit against the company brought by families of victims of paramilitary violence, arguing that the company cannot be directly linked to the killing of over 4,000 people by the illegal armed groups. In 2007, Chiquita was found guilty of paying paramilitaries $1.7 million from 1997 to 2004 and was fined $25 million.

Colombia: Vitriol, violence and threats of strikes as election approaches

Cross-posted with Conflict Journal

This is a weekly roundup of events from 13 April to 19 April 2014.

A report from the Washington Office on Latin America entitled “Ending 50 Years of Conflict” expressed confidence in the potential of ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the FARC to realize a final deal by the end of this year. The report also called on the US to increase financial and diplomatic support to ensure that Colombia can meet post-conflict challenges, such as “bringing government into lawless areas; demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; assisting displaced populations’ return; protecting rights defenders; helping to fulfill accords on land, political participation, and victims.” US aid to Colombia has been declining by an average of 10-15% per year for the past few years.

Colombia’s military spending rose by 13% in 2013, one of the largest increases in the region. Military spending throughout all of Latin America increased by 2.2% in 2013, bringing the total regional increase since 2004 to 61%. Colombia spends more than any other country in the region on its military as a percentage of GDP, and is second only to Brazil – the largest country in the region – in total expenditures. The majority of Colombia’s military spending is directed at fighting armed groups like the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as violent organized crime groups.

President Santos reaffirmed his commitment to the peace negotiations with the FARC in an interview with W Radio. He criticized the FARC for ongoing attacks during the negotiations, saying “What objective are you seeking? What military advantage does it give you? None, it only undermines the confidence of the people in the peace process.” The FARC were suspected of bombing another section of the Panamerican highway this week after a similar attack on April 1. Last week, three policemen were killed in an ambush by FARC forces.

Santos also criticized opponents of the peace process as “lords of fear,” perhaps referring to one of his main rivals in the upcoming presidential election, Óscar Iván Zuluaga, who (along with his highest-profile supporter, former President and senator-elect Alvaro Uribe) has been critical of the negotiations.

In an interview with a Colombian news outlet, the leader of the ELN, Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista (alias “Gabino”), said that his group is seeking peace talks with the government. The ELN is not party to the ongoing negotiations between the government and the FARC. Gabino slammed the Santos administration and Colombia’s “oligarchy” saying that they have “no desire” for peace, “they are thirsty for blood and violence” and they “get rich with war…They are selfish, arrogant, warmongering. They despise the humble and only look at them as a work force that enriches [the powerful].”

Two policemen were killed in the northeastern department of Arauca. RCN Radio attributed the attack to the ELN, which is known to be active in the area, but neither that group, nor the FARC have claimed responsibility for the killings. An unidentified group intimidated a work crew making repairs to an oil pipeline in the northeastern region of the country and torched their truck. Last week, repeated ELN attacks on an oil field in that area forced roughly 500 employees to be put on leave.

In the interview, Gabino also expressed outrage over the political dismissals of former Senator Piedad Cordoba and former Bogotá mayor Gustavo Petro and admitted that there were minors associated with his group. Colombia’s Ombudsman’s office demanded that the ELN disclose the number of minors in their ranks.

The ELN is Colombia’s second-largest armed group after the FARC, with about 2,000 troops. President Santos has indicated his willingness to begin a peace dialogue with the ELN in the past.

Headlines:

According to a report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Colombia has the 10th highest murder rate in the world, even though the country’s homicide rate has dropped by nearly half since 2002.

Colombia is the eighth-worst country in the world for impunity in attacks on the press, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.

Members of the U’wa indigenous group met with Colombia’s ministers of mines and energy, the interior and the environment after refusing to allow repairs to the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline following attacks from rebel guerrillas that had damaged it.

Four members of the Colombian military were sentenced to decades in prison for killing civilians and presenting them as combat fatalities in order to boost their “body count” in the country’s armed conflict. The ongoing “false positives” scandal has involved hundreds of members of Colombia’s military. In an July 2013 report, the Prosecutor General’s Office said it had found that the armed forces and civilian collaborators had killed 3,896 civilians since 1986.

Two young men were found dismembered in Buenaventura, the port city considered to be one of the most dangerous areas of Colombia. The deaths were the first murders reported since the army took over security operations in the city in late March. For more on the situation in Buenaventura see our previous post.

Seven members of the Urabeños gang were killed in an army operation in the department of Antioquia.

Colombian miners said they will join with farmers in a nationwide strike planned for April 28, less than a month before the country’s presidential elections. For more on the planned strike, see our previous post.

Colombian authorities arrested 15 members of the criminal group known as “La Línea” who were accused of assassinating a businessman last year for failing to make a $50,000 extortion payment.

Colombian police arrested 5 men wanted for extradition to the United States to face charges of cocaine trafficking.

Members of a neo-Nazi group known as Tercero Fuerza (“Third Force”) allegedly vandalized a Bogotá graffiti mural honoring the thousands of victims of violence committed against the Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union or “UP”), the political party co-founded by the FARC in the 1980s. The UP performed better during the 1986 elections than any other leftist party in Colombian history. However, after the election, a brutal campaign of assassination and murder by right-wing paramilitaries brought about the massacre of 4,000-6,000 UP members, including the party’s leader, Jaime Pardo.

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Colombia’s success in combating the production of cocaine within its borders is likely pushing drug traffickers to use product sourced from Peru. “We are seeing the same phenomenon as 30 years ago, when coca base arrived from [Peru and Bolivia] and they produced [cocaine] hydrochloride here,” said the chief of the Anti-Narcotics Police General Ricardo Restrepo. Restrepo said that the port of Cartegena is particularly affected because of its status as a major point of departure for containers, especially those destined for European markets.

One of the oldest crime syndicates in Medellín, the Oficina de Envigado, apparently wants to lay down its weapons. According to two of the group’s self-proclaimed leaders, the demobilization “won’t happen overnight” but their desire to dismantle the gang is fueled by the feeling that “those who have been victimized most are [their] own families.”

The FARC may be selling coca plantations and cocaine labs to the Mexico-based Sinaloa Cartel in anticipation of a peace deal with the Colombian government. The FARC are estimated to control a majority of the country’s cocaine trade.

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Acid attacks against women in Colombia are receiving increased attention after a wealthy woman was victimized. According to Colombian officials, more than 900 cases of acid attacks have been recorded in the last 10 years.

Criminals in the US, Central America and even Colombia appear to be using homemade guns more often. As Fusion puts it, these weapons are “unserialized, unregistered and totally legal – and they’re being used to kill people.”

World-renowned Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez passed away this week. President Santos declared three days of national mourning for the “most loved and most admired compatriot of all times.”